Value Creation Plan: The Revenue Playbook for PE/VC

The revenue value creation plan is the strategic document that frames, across the entire holding period of a PE or VC investment, the revenue growth levers needed to close the gap between the spontaneous organic trajectory and the exit ambition set out in the investment thesis. In most B2B portfolio companies, the revenue component drives 50 to 70% of total value creation over the holding period. It is the backbone of the VCP, the discipline that governs capital allocation, key hires, and the governance cadence over three to seven years.

A revenue VCP that holds up is neither an extrapolated annual budget, nor a recycled diligence business plan, nor a simple list of commercial initiatives. It is a capital-aligned plan built bottom-up from the organic run rate and top-down from the target multiple, with the gap between the two closed by a limited number of structuring bets. Yet the post-investment diagnostics we run with B2B scale-ups between €10M and €100M ARR reveal a recurring pattern: 60 to 70% of VCPs initially drafted at closing either carry too many levers (10+ scattered initiatives), are insufficiently tied to exit valuation, or fail to survive the first annual review because they confuse ambition with a plan.

This guide details the logic for building a revenue VCP that an Operating Partner and their CEO can actually use: the structural difference between a VCP, a business plan, and a budget; the five major families of revenue levers with their horizon and risk profile; the valuation bridge mechanics that connect operational levers to the expected MOIC; the bottom-up construction that surfaces the gap to close; the commitment discipline that limits the number of bets; the allocation of human and capital resources; the inevitable trade-offs between profitability and growth; how the plan evolves across the three typical phases of the holding period; the communication rituals toward the CEO, management, the board, and LPs; and the eight recurring mistakes observed in VCPs that miss their exit target.

Key takeaways

• The VCP is not a business plan: it is a capital-aligned plan that starts from the target exit multiple and works back down to the revenue levers that make it achievable, initiative by initiative and year by year.
• 5 structuring revenue levers: organic growth (new logos + ACV), retention & expansion (NRR > 110%), geographic expansion, segment expansion (moving upmarket or downmarket), bolt-on acquisitions.
• Commitment discipline: a VCP that holds up contains 3 to 5 major bets, not 10 initiatives. Beyond 5 bets, execution dilutes and follow-up becomes a formality.
• Explicit valuation bridge: every lever must be translated into a quantified impact on exit ARR, margin, and multiple. Without a documented bridge, the VCP drifts into a wish list.
• Bottom-up then top-down construction: start from the organic run rate projected over the holding period, compare it against the fund's ambition, and close the gap with properly sized initiatives.
• The VCP evolves in three phases: locked down in year 1, refined in year 2, adapted in year 3. A VCP frozen for 5 years is a dead VCP.
• Retention is structurally underweighted: 35 to 50% of revenue value creation comes from NRR in mature SaaS portfolio companies, versus the 25% most OPs perceive during the framing phase.

> "Companies that make the leap from one stage to the next do not do it by piling up initiatives. They do it by identifying the one discipline that frames everything else, concentrating their resources on it, and methodically refusing anything that dilutes that concentration." > > Jim Collins, Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap and Others Don't (HarperBusiness)

What a value creation plan is, and what it isn't

The ambiguity surrounding the VCP at many funds is the source of half the dysfunctions we observe between the Operating Partner and the CEO. A poorly defined VCP creates asymmetric expectations, reviews that spin their wheels, and constant arbitration between competing priorities. The first discipline is to pin down what a VCP is, and what it isn't.

The VCP is a capital-aligned plan

A revenue VCP is not a commercial forecast. It is built from the exit the fund expects and works down toward the levers that make it possible. The starting point is always a target valuation at a given horizon, tied to an exit multiple that is reasonably defensible against sector comparables. From that point, you work back up to the ARR, margin, and growth that justify the valuation, then to the initiatives that produce those metrics. This methodological inversion is what structurally distinguishes the VCP from a classic strategic plan, which starts from management's ambition and then tries to find the resources to match it.

It is not an extended diligence business plan

Many VCPs are in reality diligence business plans stretched out over the holding period, with extrapolated growth rates, generic margin improvement assumptions, and a flat multiple assumption. This approach produces documents that do not survive the first year. A VCP is an action plan with dated bets, named sponsors, and a review mechanism, not a detailed financial forecast. Financial modeling is the VCP's tool, not its content.

It is not an annual budget or a set of OKRs

The annual budget is the short-term execution instrument, built bottom-up by management and approved by the board. OKRs are the quarterly operational translation instrument, calibrated by organizational level. The VCP sits a notch above both: it frames the multi-year strategy that the budget and OKRs then break down into execution. Confusing the three produces either an over-detailed VCP that blocks operational agility, or a VCP so vague it never translates into execution.

For the Operating Partner onboarding version, see Portfolio 100-day plan: OP method, and for the initial framing, see Revenue due diligence: OP method.

Why the revenue component drives 50 to 70% of value creation

In B2B portfolio companies, the breakdown of value creation over the holding period follows a relatively stable structure, with proportions that vary by asset class and maturity stage.

The four-source MOIC breakdown

The exit multiple breaks down into four additive drivers: ARR growth (the primary lever for scale-ups), margin expansion (a secondary but often underestimated lever), multiple arbitrage (multiple expansion or compression between entry and exit, more often suffered than chosen), and finally deleveraging for LBOs. The revenue component of the VCP drives the first two, and indirectly influences the third through the quality of exit metrics (high NRR, a solid rule of 40, gross margin premium).

The relative weight of drivers by stage

A B2B scale-up between €10M and €30M ARR draws 70 to 80% of its value creation from pure growth. A mid-market company between €30M and €80M ARR balances growth and margin more evenly, with 50 to 60% of MOIC carried by revenue growth and 25 to 30% by margin expansion. A late-stage company above €80M ARR sees growth structurally slow down, margin ramp up, and the multiple face the gravitational pull of reverting to the sector average. The VCP must therefore calibrate its revenue levers by stage rather than apply a single playbook.

SaaS vs non-SaaS B2B specifics

In SaaS, structural NRR (> 110% targeted) turns the installed base into a growth engine with no marginal CAC. The retention and expansion component of the VCP then mechanically drives 35 to 50% of value creation. In non-SaaS B2B (services, perpetual software, B2B hardware), the logic shifts toward new-logo acquisition and margin expansion, with retention handled differently. A VCP that applies a SaaS grid to a non-SaaS business produces unsustainable NRR targets and poorly calibrated retention initiatives.

The 5 structuring revenue levers of a VCP

The revenue levers of a B2B VCP fall into five major families whose combination produces the target trajectory. Each has its own horizon, risk profile, investment cost, and expected impact on the exit multiple.

Lever 1: accelerating organic growth

Organic growth combines two sub-levers: acquiring new logos and increasing average ACV on existing customers. This lever is generally the most visible and best sized in VCPs, but it is also the one whose acquisition assumptions are most often over-calibrated. A plan that claims it will double the acquisition rate in 18 months without sizing sales capacity, sustainable CAC, and funnel maturity always pays the price at the year-2 review.

To go further, see B2B CAC: customer acquisition cost and Sales forecast accuracy.

Lever 2: retention and expansion

The retention lever brings together reducing gross churn, increasing NRR through upsell and cross-sell, and improving gross retention on mature cohorts. This lever is structurally underweighted in most VCPs drafted at closing, even though it is often the most predictable and the least capital-intensive. NRR moving from 100% to 115% on a €40M ARR installed base produces €6M of additional ARR per year with no CAC, which typically represents two to three times the impact of an acquisition initiative of comparable size.

See NRR: Net Revenue Retention, CSM expansion and upsell, and Silent NRR erosion: the risk.

Lever 3: geographic expansion

Geographic expansion means opening one or two new countries or regions over the holding period, typically through a direct entry model or a local partnership. This lever has a long horizon (12 to 24 months before meaningful contribution), a high investment cost (€1M to €3M for a properly structured European launch), and a medium-to-high risk profile depending on the maturity of the target market. It is particularly well suited to portfolio companies that have achieved robust market proof in their home geography.

Lever 4: segment expansion

Segment expansion covers two opposite trajectories: moving upmarket (SMB to mid-market, mid-market to enterprise), which increases ACV and NRR, or moving downmarket (mid-market to SMB via self-service), which opens up a volume market. The two trajectories are structurally different and cannot be implemented with the same resources. A poorly calibrated move upmarket destroys the efficiency of the existing funnel and creates a toxic two-headed sales organization. Moving downmarket without a product overhaul causes a margin hemorrhage.

See B2B pricing: strategies and mistakes for the pricing implications of these trajectories.

Lever 5: bolt-on acquisitions

Bolt-on acquisitions involve acquiring one or more complementary companies over the holding period, typically to add a technology building block, a geography, a customer segment, or key talent. This lever has a 12-to-36-month horizon, a massive impact when it works (1 to 2x the initial MOIC on well-executed deals), and an integration risk that destroys more value than the deal creates when poorly managed. Most majority PE funds build at least one bolt-on into the initial VCP.

The valuation bridge: connecting levers to MOIC

The valuation bridge is the central document of the revenue VCP. It is what translates each operational initiative into a quantified impact on exit valuation, and its absence is what turns most VCPs into a wish list disconnected from the thesis.

The canonical bridge structure

A revenue valuation bridge follows a simple additive structure: start from entry EV, add each lever's contribution to exit ARR, adjust for margin, apply the expected exit multiple, and compare against the fund's target. This construction makes the gaps between ambition and execution visible: a lever that claims it will generate €10M of additional ARR must be backed by a credible operational mechanism, otherwise it shows up as a placeholder that the first review will catch.

The 4-block bridge template

This structure must be populated at three levels of assumptions (low, base, high) to force the OP and the CEO to make dependencies explicit. The best VCPs explicitly surface the trigger thresholds that shift the plan between scenarios: if the US expansion reaches €5M ARR at 18 months, the plan moves from the base scenario to the high scenario.

Sensitivity to the exit multiple

A VCP that ignores multiple dynamics drifts into a plan disconnected from market reality at exit. SaaS multiples have swung between 6x and 20x over the past five years, which means a portfolio company that hit every metric target can still exit at half the planned MOIC if the multiple has contracted. The discipline is to build the VCP on a reasonably conservative multiple, identify the levers that support the multiple (NRR, rule of 40, gross margin premium), and track their quarterly evolution as a leading indicator of valuation.

For execution cadence, see B2B revenue KPIs: CEO metrics and Revenue financial controls: unit economics.

Bottom-up construction: from run rate to ambition

Building a rigorous revenue VCP requires a double pass: bottom-up from the projected organic run rate, and top-down from the exit ambition. The gap between the two is what the structuring levers must close.

Projecting the organic run rate

The organic run rate is the trajectory the portfolio company would follow if nothing changed: same commercial initiatives, same hiring rate, same NRR, same funnel. This projection is rarely done properly in VCPs, which jump straight to the target without qualifying the starting point. The discipline is to project the trajectory over 3 to 5 years at flat acquisition, flat NRR, and flat CAC, to surface what the company would produce with no intervention at all.

In the post-investment diagnostics we run, the gap between the projected organic run rate and the fund's target is typically 30 to 60% of the targeted exit ARR. This gap is not closed by magic: it must be explicitly allocated across the VCP's 3 to 5 structuring levers, each with a properly sized contribution.

Gap analysis by lever

This grid makes the concentration of effort visible. A VCP that claims it will close a €50M ARR gap over five years with five levers each activated at 20% of their potential is a VCP that does not hold up. The arithmetic of the gap forces prioritization.

The discipline of concentration

Jim Collins documented this in Good to Great: companies that make the leap do so by concentrating their resources on a very limited number of cardinal bets, not by piling up initiatives. This discipline applies directly to the VCP. A VCP with 10 active levers is a VCP that hasn't made its choices. A VCP with 3 to 5 properly sized levers is an executable VCP.

Commitment discipline: limiting the number of bets

Limiting the number of bets is probably the hardest discipline to maintain in a VCP. Yet it is the one that separates plans that hit their target from those that drift into a box-ticking exercise.

The rule of 3 to 5 major bets

A revenue VCP that holds up contains 3 to 5 major bets, no more. Each bet is sized to the scale of its expected MOIC impact (a minimum contribution of 0.3x MOIC to qualify as a major bet), has a named sponsor, is tied to quarterly metrics, and is explicitly budgeted. Beyond 5 bets, managerial attention dilutes, the quarterly review becomes a formality, and the plan drifts within the following year.

The bet / initiative / BAU distinction

A clean VCP distinguishes three levels of execution. BAU (business as usual) is the execution of the existing revenue engine, which produces the organic run rate and does not need to be documented in the VCP. Initiatives are continuous-improvement operational workstreams (pay plan redesign, setting up a deal desk, CRM upgrade), which can number 10 to 15 per year and are run by management. Bets are the structuring wagers that justify the VCP thesis, numbering 3 to 5 per holding period, and are jointly steered by the OP and CEO with dedicated board reporting.

The bet sheet format

Every bet in the VCP must be documented on a one-page sheet following a standard structure: title, hypothesis being tested, target MOIC contribution (low, base, high), required investment (capex, opex, hiring), executive sponsor, quarterly progress metrics, critical dependencies, failure scenario, and go/no-go review date. This sheet is the contract between the OP, the CEO, and the board on that bet.

Resource allocation: the plan behind the plan

A revenue VCP that is not backed by a detailed resource plan is a theoretical VCP. The quality of resource allocation is what distinguishes an executable VCP from a positioning document.

The multi-year hiring plan

Every major bet has an associated hiring plan: which roles are needed, at what seniority, in which geography, on what timeline. This plan is often the VCP's real bottleneck. A geographic expansion bet that projects an €8M ARR contribution at 24 months but whose hiring plan doesn't bring in a senior regional VP by month 6 will not hold. The multi-year hiring plan must be negotiated with the CEO and CFO, written into the budget, and tracked quarterly.

Incremental budget by bet

The VCP budget is built as a differential against the BAU budget. Each major bet has an annualized incremental budget that covers the investments needed to launch and sustain it. This incremental budget is often 15 to 30% of the total budget on accelerating portfolio companies, and it must be explicitly arbitrated with the CFO so it does not compete with ongoing operational needs.

The capital reserve

Disciplined VCPs set aside a capital reserve for unforeseen opportunities: an opportunistic bolt-on, an exceptional hire, accelerating a bet that is overperforming. This reserve is typically 10 to 20% of the total envelope and is arbitrated by the board on the OP's proposal. A VCP that allocates 100% of resources at closing has no room left to capture opportunity when it arises.

For financial steering discipline, see Sales forecast accuracy and Revenue financial controls: unit economics.

The unavoidable trade-offs of a revenue VCP

An honest VCP puts the structuring trade-offs on the table rather than dodging them. Three of them come up systematically and deserve explicit treatment in the document.

Profitability vs. growth

The first trade-off is between accelerating growth and improving profitability. On an accelerating portfolio company, every euro invested in acquisition destroys margin in the short term to create ARR in the long term. The simple 12-to-18-month CAC payback rule is not enough to arbitrate this: the fund's preference must be made explicit, between a high rule of 40 at exit (defensive profile) and maximized ARR at a compressed multiple (offensive profile). A VCP that doesn't settle this trade-off generates permanent tension between the CFO and the CRO.

Consolidation vs. expansion

The second trade-off is between consolidating the installed base (retention, NRR, upmarket expansion on existing customers) and expanding into new territories (new segments, new countries, new products). Every euro of managerial attention allocated to one is taken away from the other. A VCP that claims it will do both at full throttle systematically underestimates management bandwidth. The pragmatic rule is to pick a dominant pillar and a complementary pillar, with an attention ratio of 70/30 or 60/40.

Stay vs. sell timing

The third trade-off is exit timing. A revenue VCP that outperforms the plan raises the question of an early exit. Sell at year 3 with a 2.5x MOIC, or hold for 5 years to target 4x? This decision is not operational, it is capital-driven and must be made by the board with the IC. But the VCP must lay out the conditions for it: which milestones trigger an exit-timing review, which market comparables to watch, and what exit-prep cadence to follow so as not to be caught off guard.

See Preparing the exit: the revenue component for exit preparation on the revenue side.

How the VCP evolves: year 1, year 2, year 3, and beyond

A VCP frozen for the entire holding period is a dead VCP. The discipline is to plan for its evolution over time, with structured major revisions and a discipline of continuity between versions.

Year 1: locking down

The first year is about locking down. The VCP drafted at closing is stress-tested against operational reality, diligence assumptions are confirmed or revised, and the 3 to 5 bets are launched with their sponsors and budgets. At the end of year 1, VCP version 2 is published, with metrics anchored in the reality observed over 12 months of ownership rather than in diligence assumptions.

Year 2: refinement

The second year is about refinement. The bets launched in year 1 show their first signals: some overperform and deserve acceleration, others underperform and must be arbitrated (continue, pivot, stop). The target MOIC arithmetic stays fixed, but the contributions per lever are recalibrated. This is typically when bolt-on M&A moves into execution after being framed in year 1.

Year 3 and beyond: adaptation and exit preparation

From year 3 onward, the VCP enters adaptation mode. The exit market becomes a dominant parameter. Exit multiples observed on sector comparables guide the trade-offs between maximum acceleration and maturing the exit metrics. Exit preparation begins 12 to 18 months before the actual sale, with a VCP review dedicated to defending the multiple and to the robustness of the metrics that will be presented to buyers.

For the cross-portfolio benchmark dimension, see Revenue portfolio benchmark: method and Challenging the CEO: an OP framework.

Communicating the VCP: four audiences, four messages

A revenue VCP that stays in the OP's drawer produces no value. Structured communication to four distinct audiences is what gives it its mobilizing power.

To the CEO: partner, not boss

VCP communication with the CEO is bilateral and iterative. The VCP is presented as a co-signed document, not an imposed mandate. The OP shares the valuation bridge numbers, the CEO shares the operational constraints, and the final version reflects an informed consensus. A VCP communicated to the CEO as a diktat produces box-ticking execution and erodes trust.

To the management team: operational translation

The management team (CRO, CFO, CMO, CSO) receives the operational translation of the VCP, not the capital-aligned document. This translation takes the form of annual and quarterly OKRs, functional budgets, and monthly reviews. The link to value creation for the fund is mentioned but not exposed in detail: the management team executes against its own metrics, not against MOIC.

To the board: cadence and arbitration

The board (GP, OP, CEO, and any independent directors) steers the VCP on a quarterly cadence. The board pack contains a summary view of progress on the 3 to 5 bets, the evolution of the valuation bridge, the arbitration decisions requested, and requests for incremental resources. The discipline of the quarterly cadence is what stops the VCP from drifting for 12 months without anyone noticing.

To LPs: narrative and proof points

LPs never receive the detailed VCP. They receive a summary narrative (2 to 3 pages per portfolio company in the LP report) that presents the thesis, progress on the major bets, and tangible signals of value creation. This communication is structured by the GP, not the OP, but it relies on the VCP as its source of truth.

The 8 recurring mistakes in VCPs that miss their target

Eight recurring mistakes explain the majority of VCPs that drift over the holding period. All of them are neutralized by a structured discipline of construction and review.

Too many simultaneous levers

The first mistake is multiplying levers beyond 5. Every additional lever reduces the managerial attention available for the cardinal levers and dilutes execution. VCPs that contain 8, 10, or 12 initiatives are typically a sign of an OP who didn't dare make the hard calls, or a CEO who wanted to preserve everything.

Unrealistic growth assumptions

The second mistake is over-calibrating growth rates. A VCP that claims it will double new-logo acquisition in 12 months without a structural funnel overhaul is engaging in magical thinking. The discipline is to anchor every growth assumption to a concrete operational element (a hire, a geo launch, a new product) that justifies it.

Ignoring M&A integration costs

The third mistake is underestimating bolt-on integration costs. A €15M ARR deal acquired at 3x ARR for €45M typically generates 10 to 20% in additional integration costs over 18 months, which erode net value creation. VCPs that book acquired ARR at face value without adjusting for synergies and costs systematically overstate the MOIC impact.

Underweighting retention

The fourth mistake is structural: retention is underweighted in most initial VCPs, because it is less visible than an acquisition initiative. Yet on mature SaaS portfolio companies, 35 to 50% of value creation comes from NRR. A VCP without a cardinal retention bet misses the most predictable lever of the holding period.

Confusing ambition with a plan

The fifth mistake is presenting what is really just a quantified ambition as a plan. A document that lists targets without backing each one with an operational mechanism, a sponsor, a budget, and a timeline is not a VCP: it's a statement of intent. The quarterly review catches it quickly, but the damage to alignment is already done.

Baking in an optimistic exit multiple

The sixth mistake is building the VCP on an exit multiple that would require a particularly favorable market environment. This implicit assumption turns the VCP into a bet on the cycle rather than on operations. The discipline is to build the VCP on a conservative multiple and identify the operational levers that support any eventual re-rating.

Failing to anticipate critical dependencies

The seventh mistake is ignoring the critical dependencies that can break execution. A geographic expansion bet that hinges on hiring a rare regional VP, an NRR bet that hinges on a product overhaul not yet budgeted, an M&A bet that hinges on a target not yet identified: every dependency left unstated is a silent impairment risk.

Failing to document the failure scenario per bet

The eighth mistake is not documenting what triggers stopping or pivoting a bet. Without a documented failure scenario, an underperforming bet gets renewed by inertia and consumes capital without creating value. The simple rule is to define, right from launch, two to three quarterly metrics whose failure over two consecutive quarters automatically triggers a go/no-go review.

Patterns observed in VCPs that hit their target

Our Revenue Health Score diagnostics conducted with B2B scale-ups, including PE and VC portfolio companies at different stages of their holding period, surface five distinctive patterns among VCPs that hit their exit target.

Concentration on 3 to 4 bets

High-performing VCPs systematically concentrate their resources on 3 to 4 major bets, with one dominant pillar (typically organic acquisition or retention) carrying 40 to 50% of value creation, and 2 to 3 complementary pillars carrying the rest. VCPs that drift contain 7 to 10 initiatives of equal weight that cancel each other out.

Non-negotiable quarterly review

High-performing VCPs are reviewed quarterly on a fixed cadence, with a standard board pack format that the CEO and OP do not negotiate away. This cadence creates an accountability discipline that catches drift within the two quarters after it appears. VCPs that miss their target are typically reviewed ad hoc, in crisis-management mode, once metrics have already been drifting for several quarters.

A single executive sponsor per bet

Every major bet has a single executive sponsor, explicitly named in the document, who carries operational accountability for its delivery. VCPs that miss their target often have multi-sponsor bets (CEO + CRO + CMO) that dilute accountability. The simple rule is: if more than one person is responsible, no one is responsible.

Explicit alignment with the management pay plan

High-performing VCPs are backed by a management pay plan that explicitly rewards hitting VCP targets. A VCP that isn't reflected in the management team's variable compensation is a paper VCP. Typical mechanics include annual bonuses indexed to 2 to 3 VCP metrics, and a management package (equity or MIP) aligned with value creation at exit.

Continuous deprioritization discipline

High-performing VCPs practice continuous deprioritization: at every quarterly review, BAU initiatives that compete with the cardinal bets are either shut down or scaled back. This discipline protects managerial bandwidth for the bets. VCPs that drift accumulate parallel initiatives and end up with a management team that is overcommitted and underperforming across the board.

For benchmark context, see Revenue portfolio benchmark: method.

Further reading

To go deeper on the structuring elements covered in this article, we recommend the following reads from our knowledge hub:

• Portfolio 100-day plan: OP method: the onboarding version that precedes building the VCP
• Revenue due diligence: OP method: the revenue analysis grid used in diligence, the foundation of the VCP
• Revenue portfolio benchmark: method: the cross-portfolio comparison that feeds VCP assumptions
• Challenging the CEO: an OP framework: the OP-CEO alignment mechanisms around the VCP
• Preparing the exit: the revenue component: revenue-side exit preparation at the end of the holding period
• CRO OKRs: taking the role: the operational translation of the VCP into OKRs
• CSM expansion and upsell: the retention and expansion bet in a VCP
• NRR: Net Revenue Retention: the structural metric of the retention lever
• B2B CAC: customer acquisition cost: the CAC methodology of the acquisition lever
• Revenue financial controls: unit economics: the unit economics that support the VCP
• B2B revenue KPIs: CEO metrics: the VCP steering metrics
• Sales forecast accuracy: making the forecast that feeds the VCP more reliable
• Silent NRR erosion: the risk: the structural risk on the retention lever
• B2B pricing: strategies and mistakes: the pricing lever in service of the VCP
• Our revenue diagnostic methodology: the ACROSS method applied to VCP framing

Sources cited

• Jim Collins, Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap and Others Don't, HarperBusiness
• Proprietary ACROSS INSIGHT data from our Revenue Health Score diagnostics conducted with B2B scale-ups between €10M and €100M ARR, including PE and VC portfolio companies at different stages of ownership

Article written by Charles-Alexandre Peretz, co-founder of ACROSS INSIGHT, based on the analysis of our Revenue Health Score diagnostics conducted with hypergrowth B2B companies, including portfolio companies building or revising their Value Creation Plan with support from PE and VC Operating Partners. Last updated: September 9, 2026.